Durandlinjen och Waziristan
Durand-Linjen Δ
är den gränsdragning i Hindu Kush, vilken överenskoms i Durandfördraget 1893, och som fortfarande utgör gränsen mellan Afghanistan och Pakistan. Avtalet skrevs under av härskaren i Kabul för Afghanistan och av dåvarande vicekonungen uti Brittiska Indien!
Den engelske förhandlaren var Sir H. Mortimer Durand (f. 1850 d. 1924). Kolonialmakten England hävdade att Durandlinjen "had settled the Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period" (Källa: Britannica, 15 ed.)
Efter erövringen av Punjab (1849) ville en del britter gå ända fram till Kandahar. /the so-called forward school/
Andra åter ville retirera till floden Indus. /the stationary school/.
Hur som helst så medförde kriget 1878-80 att området bebott av Pashtunstammen delades tvärsigenom av Durand. "The tribal area was divided into roughly equal spheres of influence". På den brittisk-indiska sidan (nuvarande pakistanska sidan) förekom sen flera stamuppror men inga alls på den afghanska sidan. Folket som bodde där erkände aldrig gränsen, de hade inte behov av någon gräns där mr Durand drog den. Att Pastunerna egentligen bort få ett eget land — står väl numera klart för alla?Nedan följer en nutida pakistansk syn på Durandlinjen. Det är i den ansedda tidskriften Dawn jag hittade artikeln. Hur indierna ser på saken vet jag inte. Pashtunerna kan nog ha en egen syn - märk att den pakistanske skribenten påstår att "afganerna" tidigare hotade med spöket Pastunistan — en egen stat för folket, Pashtunerna (Pathaner som t.ex. Salman Rushdie, mogulen från Kashmir, kallat dem)..
Använd vid sökning på exempelvis Wikipedia, en tidigare vanlig stavning av det olyckliga, icke-landet, Pakhtoonistan, t.ex. i Sigrid Kahles bok 'Från Indus till Hindukush'
U p p
Sanctity of Durand Line
THE government's decision to restore the
international status of the Durand Line represents a
correct move that deserves to be fully supported. The
idea is to set up checkposts along the common
frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to make
travel and traffic across the Durand Line subject to
normal regulatory checks and inspection. The border
between the two countries had existed only in name
even during the times when relations between Kabul
and Islamabad were at their worst. When Kabul was
virtually tied to the apron strings of New Delhi and
instigating rebellion inside Pakistan by using the
bogey of Pakhtunistan, even then the families having
relatives on the other side moved back and forth
across the border freely without requiring to comply
with travel formalities that are normally and
universally applicable in such cases.
And when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviet
troops in the late seventies, the Durand Line
virtually disappeared as millions of Afghan refugees
started pouring into Pakistan without let or
hindrance. Pakistanis welcomed their brethren in
distress with open arms. At one point as many as
three and a half million Afghan refugees were living
in Pakistan many of whom have never gone back home
even after the Soviet pullout because of the unending
civil war and the attendant hardships there. Many
Pakistanis have died inside Afghanistan fighting
alongside their Afghan brothers against the Soviets.
This is the context in which the special nature and
characteristics of the Durand Line is generally
viewed and evaluated by many.
But a new dimension has been added to it by the new
realities of life and circumstances across the Durand
Line warranting rethinking and re-evaluation. In the
three decades leading up to the Afghan war, the
porous state of Durand Line hardly had any
significant impact on Pakistan's economy or its
social life. But since the war things have undergone
a sea change. The government in Kabul has adopted a
stern code of life and governance which it may think
is in tune with the tenets and teachings of Islam but
which, by impinging on human rights, has alienated
the entire world. The international community has
responded to this situation by imposing economic and
other sanctions on Afghanistan. The upshot of it all
is that the Taliban regime has come to depend heavily
on smuggling, mainly to and through Pakistan because
of the softness of the Durand Line, for revenue
earnings.
Both these aspects - its orthodox policies putting a
premium on religious fanaticism and intolerance and
excessive dependence on smuggling to sustain its
economy - have had a seriously negative impact on
Pakistan as a whole. The sectarian elements in this
country cross over to Afghanistan, get trained at the
so-called Jihadi training camps and return to indulge
in sectarian violence and terror. These elements then
elude the law-enforcing agencies by escaping to
sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The smugglers also make
full use of the soft and porous border. Apart from
the trafficking in narcotics drugs, goods are brought
into Afghanistan from all over the world to be
smuggled into Pakistan. This is over and above the
smuggling which has been going on for ages through
the transit trade arrangement between Pakistan and
land-locked Afghanistan from the very outset. This
massive smuggling is one of the major reasons why
Pakistan's economy is in such a bad shape
today.
It is in this context that one has to view the
current efforts of the government to reinforce the
status of the Durand Line. The two countries can
always work within the ECO and even at a bilateral
level to maintain the complementarity of their
economies as has been done by the Europeans.
Cooperation between the two sides will be vital for
effective surveillance, checking and inspection along
their common border. Meanwhile, it would be in the
interest of the two countries, especially
Afghanistan, to see that those engaged in transit
trade do not use it as a cover for illegal
activities, especially smuggling of drugs. The
Afghans should understand that ultimately it would be
in their economic and social interest to see that
neither unwanted goods nor trouble-making militants
move freely across the border.
Källa:
Dawn, 26 juli 2000,
välkänd pakistansk tidning — dawn.com
U p p
Vissa gränser har alltid sagts vara heliga - propaganda oftast!
På den karta jag har som bakgrund på datorskärmen står det: Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
Alla kartor över Afghanistan är
missvisande skriver Jan Myrdal i sin
högintressanta bok 'Resa i Afghanistan' baserad
på en tvåårsresa, som Jan
tillsammans med Gun Kessle gjorde 1958-59.
Citat ur boken: Endast gränserna mot
Iran och Sovjetunionen kan betraktas som
fastställda och ömsesidigt accepterade.
Hela gränsen mellan Afghanistan och Pakistan
anses av Afghanistan oriktig, erkännes ej. Dess
slutliga demarkation anses av Afghanistan vara en
affär mellan Afghanistan och ett fritt och
oavhängigt Pashtunistan. Viktigt att hålla
i minnet: Pashtunistan anges i Afghanistan ej vara
afghansk irredenta utan en självständig
systernation.