Durandlinjen och Waziristan

Durand-Linjen Δ

är den gränsdragning i Hindu Kush, vilken överenskoms i Durandfördraget 1893, och som fortfarande utgör gränsen mellan Afghanistan och Pakistan. Avtalet skrevs under av härskaren i Kabul för Afghanistan och av dåvarande vicekonungen uti Brittiska Indien!
Den engelske förhandlaren var Sir H. Mortimer Durand (f. 1850 d. 1924). Kolonialmakten England hävdade att Durandlinjen "had settled the Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period" (Källa: Britannica, 15 ed.)
Efter erövringen av Punjab (1849) ville en del britter gå ända fram till Kandahar. /the so-called forward school/
Andra åter ville retirera till floden Indus. /the stationary school/.
Hur som helst så medförde kriget 1878-80 att området bebott av Pashtunstammen delades tvärsigenom av Durand. "The tribal area was divided into roughly equal spheres of influence". På den brittisk-indiska sidan (nuvarande pakistanska sidan) förekom sen flera stamuppror men inga alls på den afghanska sidan. Folket som bodde där erkände aldrig gränsen, de hade inte behov av någon gräns där mr Durand drog den.   Att Pastunerna egentligen bort få ett eget land —   står väl numera klart för alla?

Nedan följer en nutida pakistansk syn på Durandlinjen. Det är i den ansedda tidskriften Dawn jag hittade artikeln. Hur indierna ser på saken vet jag inte. Pashtunerna kan nog ha en egen syn - märk att den pakistanske skribenten påstår att "afganerna" tidigare hotade med spöket Pastunistan   —   en egen stat för folket, Pashtunerna (Pathaner som t.ex. Salman Rushdie, mogulen från Kashmir, kallat dem)..

Använd vid sökning på exempelvis  Wikipedia,   en tidigare vanlig stavning av det olyckliga, icke-landet, Pakhtoonistan, t.ex. i Sigrid Kahles bok 'Från Indus till Hindukush'

U p p

Sanctity of Durand Line

THE government's decision to restore the international status of the Durand Line represents a correct move that deserves to be fully supported. The idea is to set up checkposts along the common frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to make travel and traffic across the Durand Line subject to normal regulatory checks and inspection. The border between the two countries had existed only in name even during the times when relations between Kabul and Islamabad were at their worst. When Kabul was virtually tied to the apron strings of New Delhi and instigating rebellion inside Pakistan by using the bogey of Pakhtunistan, even then the families having relatives on the other side moved back and forth across the border freely without requiring to comply with travel formalities that are normally and universally applicable in such cases.

And when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviet troops in the late seventies, the Durand Line virtually disappeared as millions of Afghan refugees started pouring into Pakistan without let or hindrance. Pakistanis welcomed their brethren in distress with open arms. At one point as many as three and a half million Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan many of whom have never gone back home even after the Soviet pullout because of the unending civil war and the attendant hardships there. Many Pakistanis have died inside Afghanistan fighting alongside their Afghan brothers against the Soviets. This is the context in which the special nature and characteristics of the Durand Line is generally viewed and evaluated by many.

But a new dimension has been added to it by the new realities of life and circumstances across the Durand Line warranting rethinking and re-evaluation. In the three decades leading up to the Afghan war, the porous state of Durand Line hardly had any significant impact on Pakistan's economy or its social life. But since the war things have undergone a sea change. The government in Kabul has adopted a stern code of life and governance which it may think is in tune with the tenets and teachings of Islam but which, by impinging on human rights, has alienated the entire world. The international community has responded to this situation by imposing economic and other sanctions on Afghanistan. The upshot of it all is that the Taliban regime has come to depend heavily on smuggling, mainly to and through Pakistan because of the softness of the Durand Line, for revenue earnings.

Both these aspects - its orthodox policies putting a premium on religious fanaticism and intolerance and excessive dependence on smuggling to sustain its economy - have had a seriously negative impact on Pakistan as a whole. The sectarian elements in this country cross over to Afghanistan, get trained at the so-called Jihadi training camps and return to indulge in sectarian violence and terror. These elements then elude the law-enforcing agencies by escaping to sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The smugglers also make full use of the soft and porous border. Apart from the trafficking in narcotics drugs, goods are brought into Afghanistan from all over the world to be smuggled into Pakistan. This is over and above the smuggling which has been going on for ages through the transit trade arrangement between Pakistan and land-locked Afghanistan from the very outset. This massive smuggling is one of the major reasons why Pakistan's economy is in such a bad shape today.

It is in this context that one has to view the current efforts of the government to reinforce the status of the Durand Line. The two countries can always work within the ECO and even at a bilateral level to maintain the complementarity of their economies as has been done by the Europeans. Cooperation between the two sides will be vital for effective surveillance, checking and inspection along their common border. Meanwhile, it would be in the interest of the two countries, especially Afghanistan, to see that those engaged in transit trade do not use it as a cover for illegal activities, especially smuggling of drugs. The Afghans should understand that ultimately it would be in their economic and social interest to see that neither unwanted goods nor trouble-making militants move freely across the border.


Dawn, 26 juli 2000,
välkänd pakistansk tidning — dawn.com

U p p

Vissa gränser har alltid sagts vara heliga -
              propaganda ofta!

På den karta jag har som bakgrund på datorskärmen står det: Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Alla kartor över Afghanistan är missvisande skriver Jan Myrdal i sin högintressanta bok 'Resa i Afghanistan' baserad på en tvåårsresa, som Jan tillsammans med Gun Kessle gjorde 1958-59.
Citat ur boken: Endast gränserna mot Iran och Sovjetunionen kan betraktas som fastställda och ömsesidigt accepterade. Hela gränsen mellan Afghanistan och Pakistan anses av Afghanistan oriktig, erkännes ej. Dess slutliga demarkation anses av Afghanistan vara en affär mellan Afghanistan och ett fritt och oavhängigt Pashtunistan. Viktigt att hålla i minnet: Pashtunistan anges i Afghanistan ej vara afghansk irredenta utan en självständig systernation.

Uppdateringar av hemsidan

 All uppdatering flyttas juli [oktober] 2010 till sidan:


Videos Durand Line på YouTube

U p p