En dam av ädel vandel som står i tobakshandel, hon sjunger mellan kaggarna i Ljunglöfs mörka bod: Min vän är skön och god. Han rider över gärdet med sporrarna och svärdet; melo, melo, melodikum, det spelar i mitt blod. Jag vet hans vissa kosa, då aftonen är när; sitt hjärta och sin dosa han till mitt altar bär. Du ädla mö i handel, jag är en man av vandel, en första klassens sjökapten på London och Bordeaux, där hajarna de slå. När masten börjar vekna och alla gastar blekna, melo, melo, melodikum, då sjunger jag: låt gå! Men landar jag vid Pekings tull, vid Stockholms lugna sluss, då kräver jag för hälsans skull ett hjärta och en buss. Den ädla damen svarar: Bevars, bevars för karlar, de tränga mina unga år, att väl jag sucka må, som böljorna de gå. Dock skall du ej förtvina, du stolte man av Kina, melo, melo, melodikum, din hugnad skall du få. Jag är den unga rosen som doftar friskt bland snus, konstapeln och matrosen de vädra kring mitt hus. Hav tack, hav tack, min sköna, din godhet vill jag löna, ditt lov skall flyga seglens väg från Stockholm till Shanghai, till neger och malaj. Hvar vind jag mött i natten som söker nordens vatten, melo, melo, melodikum, skall sucka vid din kaj. Så mötas vi bland dosorna som blänka vid din knut, mot aftonen, då rosorna och lyktorna slå ut.
lessons-from-the-sino-indian-war
Blaming the 1962 border conflict on China for resuming the sovereignty on Tibet following a long civil unrest is simply an Indian fantasy. If that's true, why it hasn't a second, third, or forth border war between China and India.
Källa:
www.counterpunch.org/2012/11/09
The Indians need to face the fact that there was no demarcated border between China and India when the British left India, (The McMahon Line was a proposal, not an actual agreement, and the 1914 Simla Accord did not occurred.) and it was Nehru's attitude of refusing to negotiate with China and his "forward Policy" that lead to inevitable conflict. His foolishness in believing the Chinese would not react to his aggression attributed to the unpreparedness of the Indian Troops. The Chinese actually saved the Indian army by driving the Indian down the mountain. According to the Indian Commander who commanded the Division which got defeated, his troops never has more than 5 days of food in the mountain because of poor road conditions. The Indians have to rely on air-drops to replenish their supplies. And because there was lack of flat areas to drop the supplies, his troops have to walk 30km pick up their supplies from the drop zone back to their posts. When snow started to fall in the mountain, air-drop will became impossible, and also it will be impossible to walk 30km to carry their supplies on the back. So the whole Indian army would have been starved to death if they stayed in the mountain.
The Chinese drove them down in October just before the snow fall, thus saved the entire Indian Army from total annihilation from cold and hunger and their leader's foolishness to send an army to the Himalayan mountain in the winter. No army could have survived in the Himalayan mountain during the winter, and the Chinese know this, so they wisely declared a cease fire, release the Indian prisoners and withdrew the troops. The Indian defeat was simply a blessing in disguise for them.
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